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Abstract
The paper analyzes the determinants of optimal electric capacity and contrasts these
with the requirements typically applied in a multi-regional model. We first analyze
the relationship between usual reliability criteria such as the value of lost load and
the targeted probability of failure, on the one hand, and the conditions that define
optimal level of capacity on the other. Secondly, we characterize the social gains from
energy trading between two interconnected regions that differ in terms of technologies or
demand. Market mechanisms are sufficient to reach the first best allocation, irrespective
of the correlation between national demand levels, provided that firms have no market
power and fully internalize the value of lost load due to power rationing when supplies
are inadequate. Thirdly, we explain the impact of various compensation mechanisms
such as capacity payments when producers face a regulatory capacity constraint.
JEL codes: F10, L94, D44, H57, L51
Keywords: Capacity adequacy, Electricity trade, Capacity credits, Cooperation,
Value of loss load
1 Introduction
1.1 Lack of demand response
The impossibility of storing electric power on a large scale means that consumption and
production must be balanced at every moment or power shortages will occur. Typically
consumers do not pay real-time prices, and so the optimal probability of a curtailment
or an outage will not be zero. This paper examines the question of how market-based
balancing - meaning that all wholesale buyers and sellers respond in real-time to price
changes and price adjusts instantaneously to maintain equilibrium - will compare with
their optimal levels. The paper examines how market mechanisms may not result in
optimal capacity, also due to coordination malfunctions across jurisdictions, when sup-
pliers fail to internalize consumer costs of power outages. We explore the impact of
various types of corrective regulatory intervention. In practice, regulators and system
operators do not rely on extreme price spikes accompanied by intermittent curtailments
to incentivize investment. In what follows we find conditions under which the capac-
ity planning mechanisms used in practice, such as capacity markets and credits, can
approximate optimal outcomes.
It is most commonly the case that consumers pay time-invariant prices, producers
have to provide whatever quantity consumers demand, which is random, and options for
storing electricity are very limited. These features of energy markets have two implica-
tions. The first is that an installed capacity which adequately ensures a reliable energy
supply means that there will be idle capacity, except when demand is near its peak. The
second is that any efficient balancing process requires regulation or centralized planning.
Continuous consumption of a non-storable product and lack of real-time metering
mean that most consumers cannot effectively respond when shortages are developing
and wholesale prices are peaking. Unless price-responsive demand is a large share of the
load, price spikes alone cannot be relied upon for system balancing. Furthermore, unless
a market is served by a single supplier not connected to any other regions, there will
be efficiency gains from coordinating the balancing needs among the suppliers across
regions. And when a downstream energy market is served by multiple retailers, the
provisions any one retailer makes to ensure reliable supplies for its customers affects
the reliability of the entire grid. This paper identifies the conditions that determine
optimal capacity, and then compares these conditions with different approaches for
ensuring resource adequacy, including energy-only markets and auctioning of capacity
credits.
In what follows, we focus on the case of two regions, in which the entire demand is
price inelastic, but varies with non-price variables, such as weather conditions. Leaving
some - possibly a very small amount of - demand unserved with a positive probability
will be optimal whenever the consumer losses from doing so are less than the cost of
covering the entire demand. However, public authorities and private firms can have
divergent evaluations of the value of unserved demand, leading to divergent views on
what production capacity to install. This is particularly the case when there are mul-
tiple retail providers serving the same geographic area. We analyze how firms adapt
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to capacity obligations and financial compensation when they can trade energy and
capacity credits between the two interconnected regions.
1.2 Security of supply
The capacity problem has been scrutinized in the economic literature from a number
of quite different points of view.1 The standard model is the same as in all industries:
capacity is just one input among others to produce and sell energy. If some firms derive
insufficient revenue from energy sales to cover all costs, in particular capacity costs,
they will go out of business. Exit or reductions in capacity then drives up energy prices
to rebalance demand and the remaining supply. Applied to the electricity industry, this
is the ‘energy-only’ model (Hogan 2005, Joskow 2008): the number of active firms at
equilibrium is the one that maximizes welfare. In this framework, if firms belonging
to the set of firms active at first best cannot recoup their costs, it is due to regulatory
distortions that create a ‘missing money’ problem. In practice, regulators impose price
ceilings to limit occasional market price spikes and capacity requirements to guarantee
security of supply. Price ceilings are motivated by the desire to prevent the abuse of
a dominant position in the wholesale market and to limit consumer exposure to price
volatility. Public authorities impose minimum capacity levels when producers do not
fully internalize welfare losses from energy outages.
The ‘output-only’ model works quite well in industries where the product can be
stored and there is demand response to scarcity signals. Price fluctuations provoke
demand reactions, and shortage is not a particularly costly event. None of this is true
however for electricity in large developed countries. As electricity is considered an
essential commodity in all domestic, commercial and industrial activities, security of
supply is a major concern for political authorities and industrial decision makers.
Guaranteeing long-term security of supply and short-term reliability without large
fluctuations in energy prices requires complementary payment to producers for main-
taining ready-to-produce capacity (Roques 2008). Finon and Pignon (2008) survey
alternative capacity mechanisms that complement energy sales to reach capacity ade-
quacy, in particular public procurement of reserve margins, capacity payments, capacity
obligations with tradable rights. Bushnell et al. (2017) provide a detailed analysis of
resource adequacy mechanisms in the USA.
We do not fully analyze these operations as we assume that producers and retailers
are vertically integrated. Nor do we consider the integration of demand response in
capacity mechanisms, like in Lambin (2016). Instead we focus on the advantages of
energy and capacity credits exchange between two regions. For this reason, our pa-
per is strongly related to the literature on international economics. Antweiler (2016)
shows that as electricity demand is stochastic and correlated across jurisdictions, elec-
tric utilities can reduce their cost during peak periods by importing cheaper off-peak
electricity from neighboring jurisdictions. We show how, as in standard trade model,
cross-jurisdictional trade, e.g. of energy produced from capacity located abroad under
1For an extensive analysis, see Le´autier (2018), Chapter 9.
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specific states of nature, can benefit both consumers and producers. However, going
beyond Antweiler’s analysis, we consider the consequences of regulations on capacity
decisions. Creti and Fabra (2007) examine the link between capacity and energy mar-
kets when generators have the option to sell electricity in an adjacent, more profitable
market. They do not analyze how trade is determined by possible correlations between
demand in the two inter-connected markets. Cepeda and Finon (2011) study a region
where the lack of design harmonization between local markets may lead to undesirable
side effects in the neighboring markets by distorting their normal functioning. Like most
papers on the topic, the regulatory tool they consider is a price-cap, whereas our paper
focusses on capacity obligations required by governments to fill the gap with investments
by private firms that do not fully internalize the disutility from power cuts. A paper
closely related to ours is Lambin and Leautier (2016) who consider two adjacent iden-
tical markets perfectly connected and managed by two independent system operators.
They show that if a system operator wants to achieve a generation capacity target, it
must have the right to reduce exports in order to avoid rationing in its own market. In
a complementary way, we analyze the gains from cooperation between system operators
to reach capacity targets in separate jurisdictions.
1.3 Outline
In section 2, we present the capacity problem faced by a social planner when demand is
a random variable following a continuous probability distribution. We contrast the nor-
mative definition of adequate capacity with ad hoc definitions used in practice, namely
maximal allowed outage duration and value of lost load.
Section 3 uses a model in which demand can take discrete values to assess sub-
optimality when two adjacent markets or regions are managed independently. We show
that an ex post energy market among electricity suppliers incentivizes producers to
invest at first best levels, provided that firms fully internalize the surplus losses of
consumers in case of electricity cuts, and that the energy market is competitive. We
emphasize the role of demand correlation across regions.
Section 4 considers the case where producers and regulators differ in their evaluation
of the losses incurred by consumers when they are rationed. We show that a system of
capacity obligations compensated by capacity payment will reach first best investment
levels when capacity credits are tradable, provided that payments are the same in the
two regions.
Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of existing capacity markets and auctions,
and of how state aid favoring local markets can adversely affect capacity decisions.
2 Alternative definitions of the optimal capacity
We first present a model of social planning under demand uncertainty, to sustain the
analysis of capacity needs. We then determine the welfare maximizing capacity and we
compare it to capacities based on two indices commonly used in practice: i) a ceiling
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on the probability of system failure, and ii) the social damage measured by the value
of lost load.
2.1 Benefits and costs
Assume that the retail price is fixed. At this price, demand, q, is random and varies
from hour to hour on the support

q, q

according to the distribution function F (q) and
density function f (q). Thus, F (q) is the probability that demand in any given hour
will be less than q. If there is no rationing, the consumption of electricity q gives a net
surplus S (q), which is increasing and concave.2 As demand is random and varies from
hour to hour, so does surplus.
The social optimization problem is to install a capacity K, at cost C (K) which is
increasing and convex, so as to maximize the expected total surplus. A lack of capacity
when q > K results in a welfare loss L (q −K) , which is an increasing and weakly convex
function.3 We do not discuss the design of the rationing rule implemented to allocate
energy when necessary, although it can be a pivotal question since the loss function L (.)
directly depends on the design of the mechanism used to allocate electricity shortage
among consumers.4
In so far as we do not consider the question of system recovery after blackouts due
to force majeure, our analysis concerns resource adequacy rather than system reliability.
Adequacy is the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electrical demand,
taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system
elements. Reliability is the ability of the bulk power system to withstand sudden distur-
bances, such as electricity short circuits or unanticipated loss of system elements, while
avoiding uncontrolled cascading blackouts.5
In all what follows, we assume that energy suppliers have cost-based access to dis-
tribution and transmission services, so that we can focus on the production and supply
stages. Also recall that we assume vertically-integrated energy-sellers, i.e. we do not
examine how producers and retailers negotiate energy transactions or capacity obliga-
tions.
2.2 First Best
The first-best level of capacity is the solution to
max
K
−C(K) +
 K
q
S(q)dF (q) +
 q¯
K
[S(K)− L(q −K)] dF (q) (1)
2See in Appendix 6.1 how this reduced-form model is derived from a more general setting.
3Convexity seems more realistic than the linear hypothesis often used in the literature (e.g. Llobet
and Padilla, 2017).
4For a detailed analysis of reliability and optimal rationing when a fraction of consumers are price-
reactive, see Joskow and Tirole (2007).
5From the ‘Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards’,
https://library.e.abb.com/public/f091b8ae9dec300f85257d6500660234/pa Stand Glossary-2.pdf
On the theoretical and empirical differences between adequacy, reliability and security of supply, see
also European Commission (2016b).
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Given the convexity properties of the surplus and cost functions, the first-order
condition is sufficient to determine a unique solution. Assuming L (0) = 0 and after
simplifying, the first-order condition can be written as
S
′
(K) [1− F (K)] +
 q
K
L
′
(q −K)dF (q) = C
′
(K) (2)
Notice that the incremental value of capacity is zero for states of the world with
low demand (q < K). An additional capacity investment has two benefits, which
are realized when demand is high: first, higher capacity results in increased surplus
from consumption since there are fewer hours of lost load, and each hour results in an
incremental surplus of S′(K).6 Second, larger capacity reduces the welfare loss from
shortages (L
′
(q −K) > 0).
Let K∗ be the solution to (2).
2.3 Operational targets
The above normative analysis provides a criterion for determining optimal capacity and
the resulting probability of blackout. To be able to determine this optimal level of
capacity, a social planner would require information about marginal net surplus S′(.),
incremental value of loss load L′(.), and marginal capacity costs C ′(.), as well as the
upper part of the distribution of probability of demand F (q) . Regulatory authorities
in charge of security of supply prefer, or are compelled, to use simpler rules based
on criteria demanding less information. Hereafter, we consider two such criteria: the
probability of failure, and the value of lost load.
2.3.1 Probability of failure
A simple practical way to choose the capacity level, based on engineering criteria, con-
sists in fixing the probability (or the frequency) of sustained blackout 1 − γ, given
the distribution of demand F (q) . Under this rule, the capacity K should be set at a
level such that the probability of failure (i.e. supply not meeting load requirement),
Pr [q > K] = 1− F (K) does not exceed the target rate. The constraint is then
F (K) ≥ γ (3)
For instance, if 10 hours a year of blackout is a maximum acceptable target, γ = 87508760 =
99.9%.
The target γ is usually determined through a political or technological process. The
result is that the level of capacity is likely to be set at an inefficient level. To be efficient,
the level of no-blackout probability should be such that
γ = F (K∗) (4)
6An alternative reading is that more capacity allows the supplier to ration fewer people if there is a
black-out.
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where K∗ is the value determined by (2). Since F (K) is a non-decreasing function, we
can deduce from (4) that the optimal investment constraint (3) can be written as
K ≥ K∗.
This criterion has the advantage of simplicity but will not result in an efficient choice
of capacities unless (4) happens to be satisfied. In practice, the threshold γ is fixed
with loose consideration of the gains and costs of additional capacity. Given the cost of
maintaining capacity idle for most of the time, in developed countries γ is probably fixed
much too high by public authorities who strongly dislike electricity outages because of
the reactions of public opinion.
For benchmarking purposes, operators and regulators use two main indexes (see
Figure 1).7 The System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) represents the
average amount of time (minutes per customer per year) that power supply is inter-
rupted. The System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) represents the av-
erage number of interruptions (per customer per year).8 There is a lack of consistency
in how the inputs to these indices are measured, both domestically and internationally.
In particular, there is discrepancy on whether storm-related outages are to be counted
as outage events. Some jurisdictions consider storm-related outages as ‘extreme’ events,
and therefore do not include them in power outage statistics. (Campbell, 2012).
On the consumer side it is difficult to distinguish between outages due to energy
shortage and those due to transport failure. In France, the energy regulator uses a
reference average duration of interruptions in year N, expressed in minutes, to compute
premiums or penalties inserted into the tariff paid to transport and distribution opera-
tors. The reference was set to 68 minutes in 2014, 67 min in 2015, 66 min in 2016 and 65
min in 2017. (CRE, 2013, p.31). For French producers, the acceptable average duration
of cuts due to imbalance between supply and demand is fixed at 3 hours a year.9
2.3.2 Value of Lost Load
The Value of Lost Load (VoLL) more closely matches the economic norm of section 2.2.
It measures the consumers’ marginal surplus. It is an index of how to value security of
electricity supply. In their approach to the optimal level of ‘Reliable Capacity’, Cramton
et al. (2013) define “... the ‘Value of Lost Load’ as the amount that consumers would
pay to avoid having supply of power interrupted during a blackout”. As shown in Figure
2, the willingness-to-pay (WTP) to avoid an outage is not the only possible definition
7For details, see http://www.l2eng.com/Reliability Indices for Utilities.pdf
8Another index is CAIDI: Customer Average Interruption Duration Index. It gives the average
duration of an interruption. With both SAIFI and SAIDI, a reduction in value indicates an improvement
in the continuity of supply. This is not necessarily true with CAIDI since it is obtained as the ratio of
SAIDI and SAIFI.
9De´cret n◦ 2006-1170 du 20 septembre 2006 relatif aux bilans pre´visionnels pluriannuels d’e´quilibre
entre l’offre et la demande d’e´lectricite´ (article 11). The 3h constraint has reportedly not been binding
for the past two decades..
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Figure 1: Unplanned interruptions per consumer in 2014 (including all events)
of VoLL. One alternative is the willingness-to-accept (WTA) payment for an outage.
Figure 2 shows that they take significantly different values.10
Knowing that additional capacity allows providers to decrease blackout duration,
for a given value of VoLL new capacity should be installed up to the point where the
additional cost (the rental cost of reliable capacity, RCC) just matches the value lost
by consumers during blackouts: V oLL×Duration = RCC.11
Starting from (2), in order to obtain
Duration =
RCC
V oLL
(5)
we must assume that
i) RCC = C
′
(K) , a constant in Cramton et al.
ii) S
′
(K) is negligible
iii) V oLL = L
′
(q −K), a constant in Cramton et al.
10See OFGEM and DECC (2013). The difference between WTA and WTP is probably related to
the ”endowment effect” analyzed by Thaler (1980): individuals value what they already own more than
something they do not yet own.
11”... suppose the average annual Duration of blackouts is five hours per year and that VoLL =
$20,000/MWh. Suppose further that the rental cost of reliable capacity (RCC) is $80,000/MW-year. If
one MW of capacity is added, it will run five hours per year on average and reduce the cost of blackouts
by $100,000/year. That is more than the cost of capacity so new capacity should be built up to the point
where the duration of blackouts falls to 4 hours per year and the marginal cost of capacity equals the
marginal reduction in the cost of lost load.” (Cramton et al. (2013). Actually, additional capacity is
likely to decrease the VoLL on top of the decrease in blackout duration.
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Figure 2: VoLL in the UK (source: OFGEM and DECC, 2013)
Under these conditions, (2) can be rewritten as
1− F (K) =
C
′
(.)
L
′ (.)
(6)
i.e. capacity must be increased up to the point where the failure rate is equal to the
ratio of marginal capacity cost to the marginal value of power outages. The criterion is
totally dependent on the V oLL, which is difficult to compute and strongly varies with
time as shown in Table 2.
Assumption (ii) may be justified when considering investment criteria. This will be
the case when production plants can be the split into two categories:
• plants Kc managed in order to supply consumers. These operators solve
max
Kc

−Cc (Kc) +
 Kc+Kr
q
S (q)dF (q) +
 q
Kc+Kr
S (Kc +Kr)dF (q)

which gives the first order condition
S
′
(Kc +Kr) [1− F (Kc +Kr)] = C
′
c (Kc) (7)
• and plants Kr devoted to capacity adequacy, controlled by the system operator.
Their capacity is determined by
max
Kr

−Cr (Kr)−
 q
Kc+Kr
L (q −Kc −Kr)dF (q)

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and the first order condition is q
Kc+Kr
L
′
(q −Kc −Kr)dF (q) = C
′
r (Kr) (8)
Because the two optimization problems are separate, the total capacity determined
by (7) and (8) cannot be exactly the same12 as the one determined by (2). Nevertheless,
the marginal surplus S
′
(.) is indirectly represented in (8) as in (7) , Kc depends on the
shape of the surplus function. It remains true that the separate solution is suboptimal
because of the lack of internalization of the private and public gains by each category
of producer.
If the marginal loss L
′
(.) is a constant, then (8) can be written in the same form as
(6) , which is similar to the Cramton’s formula (5) .
2.4 The implementation of ad hoc criteria
The observed level of capacity will typically depart from the optimal one because criteria
for resource adequacy are based on political/technical considerations. Policy makers’
risk aversion results in overestimation of the V oLL and of reliability requirement γ. The
resulting capacity is larger than the optimal one calculated using economic criteria, i.e.
utility from consumption, disutility from curtailment, installation cost, and probability
distribution of demand. To cover these capacity costs, producers need large financial
resources. If energy-only markets do not work competitively because of poor design
and/or price-caps, producers will demand financial compensation for the extra capacity
required by regulations.
In section 2.3.2 we have seen that retail service providers might prefer a different
level of capacity than a system operator when the latter is mainly concerned about
outages and the former are mainly concerned about revenues from energy sales. This
is an extreme case of lack of internalization. Inefficiency would also arise from the
inability of sellers to fully internalize the utility losses suffered by consumers during
outages. If sellers take into account only a fraction of welfare losses from power cuts, a
financial penalty covering the remaining fraction could provide the incentives to install
the first-best capacity. Unfortunately, this type of policy is not easy to implement
when there are several producers, since the lack of capacity is a kind of ‘public bad’.
Allocating the penalty among the producers is an economic challenge. A alternative
solution considered in section 4 is to pay producers a capacity reward or allow investors
in capacity to accrue revenues from the sale of capacity credits.
Public authorities also justify their intervention in capacity requirements by an al-
leged lack of coordination in investment decisions among competing producers and the
market’s failure to provide the right incentives. Under pure market mechanisms, co-
ordination should exclusively come from exogeneous price signals. However, we know
12For a given V oLL, whether Kc +Kr > K
∗ or < K∗ depends on the shape of the cost function(s).
If there is some form of economies of scale, splitting the activities increases the production cost. Conse-
quently, the commercial producers and the system operator install less capacity than the optimal level.
However, an overestimation of V oLL pushes up the needs for capacity.
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that they can fail to transmit information about externalities such as the disutility of
energy outages.
The discrepancy between public and private capacity choices can be even wider
when there are several interconnected regions, each with its own regulation (see Tables
1 and 2). In the next section we analyze the capacity decisions taken by independent
price-taking producers located in separate markets or regions, in both cases when they
can and cannot trade energy after they have built capacity.
3 Energy-only trading
In this section we examine the type of sub-optimality that results from independent
management.13 We show that coordinated production as well as ex post energy alloca-
tion is necessary for the regions to reach a global optimum when they differ in terms
of net surplus, loss value, investment cost or probability of peak demand. We allow
random demands to be independent or correlated.
3.1 Demand uncertainty
To isolate the effects of uncertainty, we adopt a simplified demand side model in which
demand can just be high (H) with probability ρ, or low (L) with probability 1−ρ rather
than the atomless demand of the former section.
Net surplus is linear St ≡ sqt (t = L,H) where the net unit surplus s is the difference
between the unit gross surplus c and the unit operating cost c. Thus, SH and SL measure
consumer welfare in states H and L respectively if there is no shortage. Net surplus is
sK −L(qt − q) if there is a shortage, i.e. if the quantity q delivered from capacity K is
smaller than demand qt.
The two markets (or regions) are indexed by 1 and 2. We first consider the case of
separate management. We then analyze the case of a single jurisdiction covering the
two regions. The social planner(s) has (have) a two-stage decision to take: i) how much
capacity Ki to install in market i (i = 1, 2), and ii) knowing the installed capacity and
the state(s) of nature, how much energy qi to deliver to market i. In the case of a single
jurisdiction, we assume that the two markets are perfectly interconnected and there are
no thermal losses on the lines.
3.2 First best
3.2.1 Autarky case
In each region i = 1, 2, the social planner must determine first the capacity Ki, and then
the energy supplied qi.When capacity isKi < qLi rather than q
L
i ≤ Ki ≤ q
H
i , the savings
on construction costs may not outweigh the loss in consumers’ surplus. Moreover power
rationing will be necessary in all states of nature instead of only state H, and the lost
13This and the next section apply both to two adjacent markets or two adjacent countries or regions
as long as there is no transmission constraint.
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surplus will be larger in state H. To limit the number of relevant cases, we assume that
the net social savings from investing in low capacity never exceed the loss in welfare
from outages. Thus, we examine only the case qLi ≤ Ki ≤ q
H
i .
14 In state L the system
operator will provide consumers with q∗iL = q
L
i so that Li(.) = 0. In state H, qiH = Ki,
so that Li(q
H
i −Ki) ≥ 0. Therefore, the optimal Ki is the solution to
max
Ki

−Ci (Ki) + ρi

siKi − Li

qHi −Ki

+ (1− ρi) siq
L
i

(9)
where ρi is the probability of state H in region i. The optimal capacity is determined
by the first-order condition
ρi

si + L
′
i

qHi −K
∗
i
	
= C
′
i (K
∗
i ) (10)
which is the transposition of condition (2) into our framework with two states of nature.
Consumption in state H will be q∗iH = K
∗
i .
3.2.2 Joint optimisation
Assume now there is one single decision maker for the two regions. Without any trans-
mission constraints, the ex post decision in each state of nature will be taken under the
common constraint q1+q2 ≤ K1+K2 with dual variable β.We maintain the assumption
that it would be socially inefficient to cut power when demand is low, which means that
qL1 + q
L
2 ≤ K1 +K2.will always be satisfied at the optimum.
Energy The following describes the optimal volumes of energy supplied to consumers
in 1 and 2 in each state of nature given K1 and K2 .
• In state HH (demand is high in both regions), energy supply is given by
max
q1 ,q2
s1q1 − L1

qH1 − q1

+ s2q2 − L2

qH2 − q2

+ βHH (K1 +K2 − q1 − q2)
where βHH denotes the dual variable of the capacity constraint in the current
state. The first order conditions give
s1 + L
′
1

qH1 − q1

= βHH = s2 + L
′
2

qH2 − q2

> 0 (11)
Then, by complementary slackness conditions, the constraint is an equality:
q1 + q2 = K1 +K2 (12)
Conditions (11) and (12) jointly determine the ex post solution in state HH as a
funtion of K1 +K2. We denote it by qi,HH , i = 1, 2.
14It also corresponds better to what we can observe in developed countries. In less developed ones,
we unfortunately find that Ki < q
L
i .
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• In state HL (high demand is in region 1 and low in region 2), since we have
assumed it would be too costly not to serve low demand, the problem is
max
q1
s1q1 − L1

qH1 − q1

+ s2q
L
2 + β
HL

K1 +K2 − q1 − q
L
2

Given the first-order condition s1 + L
′
1

qH1 − q1

= βHL > 0, we obtain
q1,HL = K1 +K2 − q
L
2 , q2,HL = q
L
2 (13)
• Symetrically, in state LH,
q1,LH = q
L
1 , q2,LH = K1 +K2 − q
L
1 (14)
• Finally, in state LL, we already know that
q1,LL = q
L
1 , q2,LL = q
L
2
Capacity Anticipating these ex post adjustments, the capacity problem is
max
K1 ,K2
EW = ρHH


s1q1,HH − L1

qH1 − q1,HH

+ s2q2,HH − L2

qH2 − q2,HH

+ρHL


s1q1,HL − L1

qH1 − q1,HL

+ s2q
L
2

+ρLH


s1q
L
1 + s2q2,LH − L2

qH2 − q2,LH

+ρLL


s1q
L
1 + s2q
L
2

−C1 (K1)−C2 (K2) (15)
The first-order condition with respect to Ki is
ρHH

s1 + L
′
1

qH1 − q1,HH
 ∂q1,HH
∂Ki
+

s2 + L
′
2

qH2 − q2,HH
 ∂q2,HH
∂Ki

+ρHL

s1 + L
′
1

qH1 − q1,HL
 ∂q1,HL
∂Ki

+ ρLH

s2 + L
′
2

qH2 − q2,LH
 ∂q2,LH
∂Ki

= C
′
i (Ki) i = 1, 2
Given the ex post adjustment (11) and (12) for state HH, (13) for state HL and
(14) for state LH, we can reduce the first-order condition in region i to
ρHH

si + L
′
i

qHi − qi,HH

+ρHL

s1 + L
′
1

qH1 − q1,HL

+ρLH

s2 +L
′
2

qH2 − q2,LH

= C
′
i (Ki)
(16)
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The gains from coordination Since condition (16) is to be met in both regions
i = 1, 2, using (11) we have the following:
Proposition 1 Under joint optimization, installed capacities must satisfy
C
′
1 (K
∗∗
1 ) = C
′
2 (K
∗∗
2 ) (17)
This is one advantage of joint optimization: the cost of installing K1 +K2 is mini-
mized, whatever the total capacity.
A second important difference with the autarky case is that the installed capacity in
each region depends not only on the surplus of local consumers but also on the surplus
of consumers from the other region. For example, consider region 1. Capacity K1 will
be used to supply energy in region 1 but some imports will come from region 2 in state
HL and some exports will feed region 2 in state LH. To emphasize these interrelations,
note that since ρHH + ρHL = ρ1, we can write condition (16) as
ρ1

s1 + L
′
1

qH1 − q1,HH

+ρHL

L
′
1

qH1 − q1,HL

− L
′
1

qH1 − q1,HH

+ ρLH

s2 + L
′
2

qH2 − q2,LH

(18)
= C
′
1 (K1)
Since q1,HL > q1,HH , the second term on the left-hand side is negative, whereas the
first and third ones are positive. The installed capacity will be higher or lower than in
the framework of separate decisions given by (10) , depending on the relative weights of
the second and third terms. If ρHL is large and ρLH small, the left hand side of (18) is
smaller than the LHS of (10) . The installed capacity in region 1 is then smaller under
the coordinated framework since the most likely event is that region 1 will import from
a region with structural low demand when local demand is high. Conversely, if ρHL is
small and ρLH large, excess capacity is to be installed in region 1 with the purpose of
exporting to region 2 when state LH occurs.
3.2.3 Correlated and independent demands
We now consider the two extreme cases of negative and positive demand correlation,
followed by the case of independent demands in order to emphasize some characteristics
of the benefits of coordination.
Perfect negative correlation: ρHH = ρLL = 0. Since ρ1 = ρ
HL, ρ2 = ρ
LH , from
(16) we obtain
ρ1

s1 + L
′
1

qH1 − q1,HL

+ ρ2

s2 + L
′
2

qH2 − q2,LH

= C
′
1 (K1) = C
′
2 (K2) (19)
This clearly shows the interdependence of the two regions, both in terms of capacity
building and in terms of energy allocation. Indeed, since qH1 − q1,HL =

qH1 + q
L
2

−
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(K1 +K2) and q
H
2 − q2,LH =

qL1 + q
H
2

− (K1 +K2), the marginal value of losses in
each region depends on the overall capacity instead of just on local capacity. Under
perfect negative correlation, each region insures the other one, since high demand in
one is always accompanied with low demand in the other. Inter-connection is highly
valuable in this situation as long as energy exchanges are feasible. Having a sum of
marginal surpluses on the left-hand side of (19) lightens the public good characteristics
of capacity since it can be used for non-mutually exclusive purposes.
As an illustration, assume that the two regions are exactly the same. Let K (γ)
denote the capacity needed to achieve the same level of reliability required by the au-
thorities in each region. If they can coordinate their capacity planning and trade energy,
in each region firms investK and buy (resp sell)K−qL when local demand is high (resp.
low). To meet the constraint, capacity must be such that K +

K − qL

= K (γ) when
demand is high. The solution to this obligation is K∗ (γ) = K(γ)+q
L
2 . Consequently, the
capacity savings from coordination and trade is K (γ)−K∗ (γ) = K(γ)−q
L
2 . That is, each
region would need to invest only half the surplus capacity of the low demand state in
order to achieve the targeted level of reliability. The rest is provided by the neighboring
region.
Perfect positive correlation: ρHL = ρLH = 0. Since ρHH = ρi, from (16) we have
ρi

si + L
′
i

qHi − qi,HH

= C
′
i (Ki) , i = 1, 2 (20)
First, note that the left-hand side of this condition (in contrast to (19)) has only
one term. This is because there are no complementarities: the two regions always face
peak capacity needs at the same times. Second, this condition is apparently similar
to (10) . However the argument of the marginal loss function is not exactly the same.
Because of the possibility of energy trade across the two regions, here there is no reason
here for it to be the case that qi,HH = Ki, contrary to the autarky case. The efficiency
condition (17) requires that the allocation of total capacity K1 +K2 = q1,HH + q2,HH
across the two regions is done in a way that depends on marginal cost functions (recall
that we assume no transmission constraints). Except for very specific values of the
parameters, even though states of nature are perfectly positively correlated, we will
then have q∗∗i,HH = K
∗∗
i .
This is shown in Figure 3 where the optimal joint allocation is represented by points
C and D determined by the simultaneous equality of expected marginal surpluses and
capacity marginal costs in both regions when there is perfect positive correlation between
demands. If the two regions are not interconnected, the best choice is given by two
separate equalities (10); see points A and B, with region 2 represented from right to
left. In this configuration, the necessity of having only locally installed capacity would
result in a difference in valuations: points A and B have different heights. By contrast,
under the possibility that one market’s capacity can provide energy to the other market,
energy and capacity values are made equal (points C and D have equal heights), resulting
in an increase of social surplus represented by area ADBC. In the graph, the marginal
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cost function of firms 1 is larger than that of firms 2. Thus, it is efficient to build
less capacity (K∗∗1 < K
∗
1) in 1 and more in 2 (K
∗∗
2 > K
∗
2). In phase 2, at times of
peak demand (in both regions), with a willingness to pay higher in 1 than in 2, a
large proportion q∗∗1,HH −K
∗∗
1 of the supply q
∗∗
1,HH in market 1 comes from the capacity
installed in market 2. We also see from Figure 3 that K∗∗1 +K
∗∗
2 > K
∗
1 +K
∗
2 . This is
due to increasing marginal costs. Indeed, K∗1 +K
∗
2 can be installed at a lower cost by
reallocating the plants between the two regions up to the point where their marginal
costs are equal. This means that C1 (K
∗
1) +C2 (K
∗
2) > C1 (K
∗
1 −∆) +C2 (K
∗
2 +∆) for
∆ not too large. For the same total cost, more capacity can then be installed when
decisions are coordinated.
If the two regions are the same from all points of view, there is no opportunity for
benefitting from trade, and therefore no gain from coordination. This can be seen from
a revised version of Figure 3: if the two regions are exactly the same, the curves of costs
and expected gains are identical in both, so that points A, B, C and D are all located
at the same place. Capacities are then the same in autarky and under coordination.
Independent demands: ρHH = ρ1ρ2, ρ
HL = ρ1 (1− ρ2) , ρ
LH = (1− ρ1) ρ2. The
first-order condition (18) of firm 1 is now
ρ1ρ2

si + L
′
i

qHi − qi,HH

+ ρ1 (1− ρ2)

s1 + L
′
1

qH1 − q1,HL

+(1− ρ1)ρ2

s2 + L
′
2

qH2 − q2,LH

= C
′
i (Ki)
Let Eπ
′
1− denote the left-hand side of (19) and Eπ
′
1+ the left-hand side of (20) . The
above condition can then be written
ρ2Eπ
′
1+ + (1− ρ2)Eπ
′
1− + ρ2 (ρ2 − ρ1)

s2 + L
′
2

qH2 − q2,LH

= C
′
1 (K1) (21)
We see that the expected marginal revenue consists of three terms. If ρ1 = ρ2, the
third term vanishes and the marginal revenue of firms 1 is just an average value of
the cases of perfect negative and positive correlations weighted by the probabilities of
demand in region 2. Consequently, the capacity installed by firm 1 is generically between
the values corresponding to these extreme cases. It is not a simple average though. The
higher (lower) ρ2, the closer capacity in 1 is to the perfect positive (negative) correlation
level. This shows that in spite of the independence of demands, investment still depends
on the possibility to trade energy among regions. The third term is an adjustment that
increases or decreases the expected marginal gains depending on firms in region 1 having
more opportunities to export to region 2 (ρ2 > ρ1) or to import from region 2 (ρ2 < ρ1)
when demand is high.
For identical regions, given (21) and the two above results, the installed capacity is
smaller than in autarky.
To sum up the above results:
16
Proposition 2 Whatever the statistical relationship between demands in neighboring
jurisdictions, cooperation between Regional System Operators increase overall welfare.
If the two regions are identical, total capacity is smaller than under autarky.
Note that in the above we have considered situations in which demand is either high
or low in each region. The results concerning the gains of social surplus araising from
coordination extend to the case of continuous probability distributions, whatever their
shape, for coordination and trade enlarge the feasible set of social planners, and social
performance cannot therefore decrease in relation to autarky.
3.3 Energy markets
Assume there is a large set of competitive energy producers in each region. In region i,
consumers are billed the non-contingent retail price pri for each unit of energy consumed.
If producers fully internalize the social value of the lost load, which could be the case
if regulators impose a large penalty in case of outage, or if suppliers are obliged to
fix the damages due to energy cuts, then producers will install the optimal capacity
K∗∗1 ,K
∗∗
2 and trade energy at contingent wholesale prices. This is a direct result of the
optimality properties of perfect competition when there is no externality, and technology
and preferences are convex. A formal proof is provided in the Appendix 6.2.
The exchange of energy across borders increases efficiency since it allows saving on
capacity costs arising from the technical advantages of the firms located in adjacent
jurisdictions serving each others’ energy consumers. Energy can flow in either direction
depending on the state of nature. This corresponds to what Antweiler (2016) names
‘reciprocal load smoothing’.
Proposition 3 Free trade of energy among jurisdictions allows the same capacity out-
come to be reached as under coordinated planning, provided that i) private operators
have no market power and ii) they fully internalize the disutility from lost load.
However implementation of open electricity markets faces political obstacles, as we
briefly discuss in the following subsection,.
3.4 Political constraints
It is clear that when capacity is chosen in a coordinated way among two inter-connected
heterogeneous regions, the optimal capacity levels are generically different from their
autarky values. Joint optimization is more efficient than separate optimization in each
region. However, coordinated allocation of capacity and energy is not always politically
feasible for a number of reasons. One is the possibility that overall welfare increase
comes at the expense of one of the two regions. For example, assume that K∗2 > q
∗∗
2,HH ,
i.e. when demand is high in the two regions, consumers in region 2 consume less under
the joint decision mechanism than under autarky (this is the case represented in Figure
3).
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This redistribution among regions 1 and 2 presents political impediments for achiev-
ing a jointly optimal outcome. Taking distributive aspects into account, the optimal
solution requires a lump sum tax in region 1 to compensate losers in region 2. This is
an impractical approach as i) raising taxes introduces additionnal distortions and ii) it
can be difficult to transfer funds accross regions. Moreover, paying the compensation
ex post may not be credible. These difficulties will tend to induce region 2 to insist on
retaining control of its own territory.
For these reasons, the participation condition q2,HH ≥ K
∗
2 should be introduced
into the joint optimization process as a political acceptability constraint. This is not
purely hypothetical. In practice, system operators do not span multiple regions, which
limits international coordination on resource adequacy, particularly within the European
Union where the European Commission tries to build electrical regions different from
those designed by system operators.15 More specifically, Member States are reluctant to
cede control of their own electric system to a regional entity covering several countries.
Their fear is that, in case of scarcity, the overall supervisor could opt for blackouts,
based on rules contrary to national interests.
4 Capacity credits
This section examines the impact of trade in capacity credits on investment.
4.1 Why capacity requirements?
Many, if not most, Regional System Operators (RSO) impose some sort of capacity
requirement on energy service providers to ensure resource adequacy. In this section we
consider the effects of one such approach, that of capacity credits on investment levels.
A system of capacity credits requires energy suppliers to obtain certificates from
owners of generation facilities in proportion to their load. The cost of the credits for the
suppliers is an additional source of revenue for generation owners, which is one purpose
of the credits. The System Operator (or the regulator) seeks to impose requirements
that suppliers obtain sufficient credits to ensure system adequacy. At the same time,
the SO will issue credits up to the amount of capacity deemed to be sufficient to ensure
resource adequacy. In most cases, the SO will offer subsidies in proportion to the credits
assigned to each generation facility. These subsidies are typically determined by means
of tenders or auctions.16
The standard justification to these mechanisms is the so-called missing money prob-
lem resulting from price-caps. Consumers, who also are voters, dislike peaking prices,
15See Crampes et al (2017).
16See European Commission (2016a).
See https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/swd 2016 385 f1 other staff working paper en v3 p1 870001.
for details of the mechanisms implemented in Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. For a recent analysis of capacity markets, see Cramton
(2017).
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which can result in political pressure to impose price ceilings. Competition policy con-
cerns are an additional reason for regulators not to allow spot energy prices to spike
during peak demand periods. Such price ceilings reduce producers’ revenues and the
returns on investment. In particular, these caps hit peak producers who are not able to
recoup their fixed costs.17 A capacity payment on top of energy revenues would then
fill the gap.
There is an alternative reason to justify the use of capacity mechanisms: contrary
to our assumption in section 3.3, but in line with our discussion in section 2, firms do
not internalize the value of lost load as much as public authorities do. Consequently,
they do not invest as much as they should from the regulators’ point of view. This is
the case we consider in what follows.
We first discuss the need for additional financial incentives when firms are obliged
to invest more than they would like to (4.2). We then consider the possibility of firms
trading capacity rights across the two regions (4.3).
4.2 Obligation and compensation
Consider the former autarky problem (9) modified as follows:
max
Ki
−Ci (Ki) + ρi

miKi − αiLi

qHi −Ki

+ (1− ρi)miq
L
i
where αi ∈ [0, 1] is a coefficient measuring the weight of the loss function in the objective
function of firms in i and mi is the unit margin from energy sales. The solution is K
α
i
given by
ρi

mi + αiL
′
i

qHi −K
α
i
	
= C
′
i (K
α
i )
Differentiating with respect to αi we obtain
dKαi
dαi
=
ρiL
′
i (.)
C
′′
i (K
α
i ) + αiρiL
′′
i (.)
> 0 (22)
Then, even ifmi = si,with a ‘private αi’ smaller than the ‘social αi’, firms will install
capacity below the socially optimal level.18 In the following, we just assume that ‘social
αi’ = 1 > ‘private αi’ so that Kα=1i = K
∗
i > K
α
i .
19 Suppose that the regional system
17In this paper, we have not differentiated between base load and peaking capacity. Typically firms
with peaking capacity must recoup their cost over a very limited number of hours. However they cannot
do so when prices are capped.
18Investment below the first-best level can also result from market power. In our framework, it could
be represented by the profit margin mi decreasing in Ki. We would then have the usual result of a
marginal revenue mi +m
′
iKi below the average margin mi = si. With this lower financial incentive,
firms would invest less than the optimal level. Here we consider that the competition authority can
block this adverse effect to competition. On the consequences of Cournot competition for capacity
levels, see Le´autier (2017), chapter 9.
19We have seen in section 2 that governments try to impose capacity levels higher than the optimal
one, K∗i , which corresponds to αi > 1. For our discussion, it is sufficient to have a public αi larger than
the one used by private firms.
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operator imposes capacity to cover at least a portion βi of high demand, that is
Ki ≥ βiq
H
i > K
α
i
Firms will obviously choose Ki = βiq
H
i . Then to implement first best, the authority
must fix β∗i =
K∗i
qHi
and the expected profit of firms in region i is
−Ci (K
∗
i ) + ρi

miK
∗
i − αiLi

qHi −K
∗
i

+ (1− ρi)miq
L
i
Since K∗i is a constrained choice, atmi = si the resulting profit is smaller than when
capacity is Kai , freely chosen. Whether the β
∗
i mechanism is implementable depends on
the associated carrot and stick system. Severe penalties in case of default solve the
capacity problem,20 as was the case in section 3. However, this does not guarantee
that the resulting profit is non-negative, i.e. we have an alternative source of missing
money, different from price caps. As noted by Joskow (2007), price caps cannot be the
only cause for the missing money problem because in most wholesale markets, they are
rarely binding constraints despite being far below estimates of the VoLL.
To solve the missing money problem, one could increase the energy retail price,
then the margin mi. This would help vertically integrated firms, not pure producers.
Moreover, it would apply to all demand, including the low demand regime. We rather
consider the possibility for firms to be rewarded for the peak demand they serve or to
be rewarded for the capacity they install.
4.2.1 Payment for peak-demand
Electricity retailers have the obligation to buy certificates from energy producers to
prove they can serve (a given fraction of) their affiliated peak demand. In our model
of vertical integration, the cost of these certificates or of additional capacities is simply
a transfer from consumers to energy producers. When the payment is based on the
exogenous value qHi , the investment and production problem of producers in i remains
unchanged at the margin if consumers have an inelastic demand, which is true in the
short run. However, the additional revenue makes a difference if it allows some firms to
remain active whereas they would prefer to go out of business without public aid. If so,
the payment for peak demand in region i can also benefit the consumers located in the
interconnected regions.
4.2.2 Payment for capacity
If the complementary payment is based on installed capacity at unit price pKi , the profit
maximizing capacity is the solution to
max
Ki
−Ci (Ki) + ρi

miKi − αiLi

qHi −Ki

+ (1− ρi)miq
L
i + pKiKi
s.t. Ki ≥ β
∗
i q
H
i (ξi)
20Penalties are steep in US regional system operators’ jurisdictions.
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The first-order condition is then
ρi

si + αiL
′
i

qHi −Ki
	
+ pKi −C
′
i (Ki) + ξi = 0
and the complementary slackness conditions read
Ki ≥ β
∗
i q
H
i , ξi ≥ 0,

Ki − β
∗
i q
H
i

× ξi = 0
If the capacity price pKi is very large, firms can have the incentive to invest be-
yond the target: Ki > β
∗
i q
H
i . If so, ξi = 0 and the capacity installed is the solu-
tion to ρi

mi + αiL
′
i

qHi −Ki
	
+ pKi − C
′
i (Ki) = 0. Otherwise, that is if ξi =
−ρi

mi + αiL
′
i

qHi −K
∗
i
	
− pKi + C
′
i (K
∗
i ) > 0, the capacity constraint is binding,
then firms invest K∗i = β
∗
i q
H
i .
In our framework where consumers and producers have equal weights in the total
surplus function, the regulator in region i is indifferent to the value of pKi . The ca-
pacity payment is a neutral financial transfer from consumers to producers. In real
life, intensive lobbying by industry players can result in excessive payments that trigger
unnecessary investment. To limit the burden on consumers, we assume that pKi is fixed
at the lowest possible value, so that firms i) just invest at the level required by the RSO
and ii) obtain the same profit as without the regulation. From the equality between
the constrained and non-constrained expected profits, we can determine the required
capacity payment pKiK
∗
i :
pKiK
∗
i = Ci (K
∗
i )−Ci (K
α
i )− ρi

mi (K
∗
i −K
α
i )− αi


Li

qHi −K
α
i

− Li

qHi −K
∗
i

(23)
We see that the driver for large capacity payment is the compensation required to
cover the additional investment Ci (K
∗
i )− Ci (K
α
i ) > 0. However, the two other terms
on the right-hand side of (23) are negative, and they mitigate the required compensation
to investors: i) with more capacity firms can sell more energy and gain the unit margin
mi on additional sales in state H; ii) with more capacity there will be fewer outage
hours. This second effect is strongly dependent on the value of αi. If αi is small, by
(22) the difference K∗i − K
α
i is large and pKi must be high. Conversely, when firms
are already strongly concerned about power cuts (high αi), pKi is low. For αi = 1, we
have Kαi = K
∗
i and then pKi = 0. In other words, this compensation mechanism can be
viewed as unfair since it rewards egoistic behavior.
4.3 Capacity credits trade
Whereas capacity mechanisms are mainly designed within national borders, private or
public regional initiatives can arise to take advantage of the heterogeneity of neighbour-
ing markets. The capacity requirement can be measured in different ways:
• the local authority imposes the autarky first best, i.e. capacity K∗i defined by (10)
in each region i, but firms remain free to trade capacity credits with firms in the
other region;
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• the target is K∗∗i determined by joint optimization in (16) ;
• the target is is not binding, i.e. it is below the freely determined value Kαi , but
capacity credits can be traded between the two regions.
Whatever the target, let us denote it by Ki.
In contrast to what we had in the case of energy trade (see section 3) capacity credits
are not state contingent since they are exchanged ex ante. What is their precise nature?
There are two main possibilities:
a) Credits entitle the right-holders to withdraw energy from the capacity of the
emitters;
b) Capacity credits are pure financial instruments designed to complement the
financial resources of producers without any additional right or obligation.
Let us denote by ki the purchase (if positive) or sale (if negative) of capacity credits
by producers in region i. In case a) the capacity that constrains energy consumption is
Ki + ki. In case b) it is Ki. We will successively consider the two cases.
In order to simplify the presentation, we assume that there is no organized ex post
market for energy.
4.3.1 Withdrawal rights
When credits entitle the right-holders to withdraw energy from the installed capacity
of the emitters, the framework is similar to one in which generation entitlements and
Virtual Power Plants are traded.21 As shown in Appendix 6.3, firms now face a form
of contingent contract for energy, essentially equivalent to that discussed in Section
3.3. However, the resulting contingent outcome is distorted by the domestic capacity
payment, if there is one. Firms from the region with the lower willingness to pay for
credits (region 2 in Figure 5 of Appendix 6.3) will be net sellers of credits at equilibrium.
This can be due to lower investment costs C
′
2 (.) < C
′
1 (.) , which is efficient. It can also be
due to higher capacity payments pK2 > pK1, which is a regulatory distortion. The local
investment given the obligation and the certificates traded is K∗i =
Ki− k∗i determined
by
C
′
1
 K1 − k∗1	− pK1 = p∗k = C ′2  K2 − k∗2	− pK2 (24)
By comparing (24) with (17), we see that when capacity payments differ among the
regions, they create a bias in the investment decisions.
4.3.2 Financial rights
If capacity credits are purely financial, firms in region i can only rely on their own
investment to supply energy. Then they solve
21On VPP, see Willems (2005)
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max
Ki,ki
−Ci (Ki) + ρi

siKi − αiLi

qHi −Ki

+ (1− ρi) siq
L
i − pkki + pKiKi
s.t. Ki + ki ≥ Ki (λi)
When the constraint is binding, the solution is Ki + ki = Ki, with
pk = C
′
i
 Ki − ki	− ρi si + αiL′i qHi − Ki + ki		− pKi
As compared to demands leading to equilibrium (24), the willingness to pay for
purely financial capacity credits is lower. In fact, here capacity credits do not have the
additional value of opening access to the energy produced in the other region and sold
in the local market. Then, as compared with composite rights, fims in region i ‘lose’
ρi

si + αiL
′
i

qHi −
Ki + ki		 for each additional certificate they buy. Additionally, we
observe the same distortion effect provoked by asymmetric capacity payments pKi.
We can then state the following:
Proposition 4 When firms can trade capacity credits among regions, if capacity pay-
ments differ from one region to the other, the installed capacities do not maximize overall
welfare. Composite capacity certificates are more efficient than pure financial rights.
Any capacity payment increase in region i, not compensated by an equal increase in
region j, incentivizes producers to install more capacity in region i and to sell credits to
region j where producers invest less. This foreign subsidization (Blonigen and Wilson,
2010) that drives the price of credits downwards is beneficial to consumers in j (there
is less capacity to subsidize) but it may push some producers out of the j market and,
in any case, it is inefficient since the cost to install K1 + K2 is not minimized. This
result has similarities with those in Cepeda and Finon (2011) who show that when two
interconnected markets are asymmetric in terms of market design (for example one has
a price-cap system), markets obtain the highest benefits from integration if they have a
common approach of capacity adequacy.
5 Conclusion
Capacity planning, also called resource adequacy, is critical for ensuring reliability of an
electrical system. The shift from central planning to market approaches for investment
and production decisions has the potential to leave gaps in reliability. This paper
identifies the conditions under which market forces can be relied upon to ensure adequate
supplies and the reasons for which, in practice, these conditions may not be met. The
limitations of market mechanisms can be the result of: political forces that impose price
ceilings on real-time electricity prices; a lack of markets or trade restrictions that reduce
potential revenues and returns on investment; a lack of coordination across regions; and
network externalities in which individual suppliers do not bear the full cost of outages.
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We explain how policy intervention, such as setting minimum capacity requirements and
introduction of capacity markets can improve reliability. However, without information
about underlying supplier costs and the loss function from outages, a grid operator or
regulator will still be unable to achieve an optimal outcome.
Capacity mechanisms also raise concerns regarding competition policy, which we
have not addressed in the paper.22 Like other forms of State intervention, public support
to capacity providers may distort competition in electricity markets, both locally and
globally. Within each region, there is a risk of maintaining active old plants that should
go out of business because they are no longer profitable and they emit pollutants. This
is not new: all governments are constantly trading off between industrial, employment,
environmental and competition-related policies. The problem is more difficult across ju-
risdictions. There is currently a strong momentum towards more inter-connected electric
systems and we have shown that capacity payments distort competition when they are
set at different levels in neighbouring regions. Regional regulators could therefore be
inclined to limit competition effects from interconnecting lines by subsidizing their local
producers through capacity payments. This is a matter of concern for the European
Commission which has investigated how Member States implement such mechanisms
(see European Commission 2016). By and large, the EC concludes its report saying
that a better market design ”should over time reduce the need for capacity mechanisms
to guarantee security of supply”. Member states are yet to be convinced.
6 Appendix
6.1 Derivation of the basic model
6.1.1 Consumers
Total and marginal surplus The gross surplus obtained by electricity buyers from
consumption q is GS(q, ε), where ε denotes a date or an event (e.g. temperature). We
assume that GS(q, ε) is increasing in both ε and q. Also, we assume it is a concave
function and ∂
2GS
∂q∂ε > 0, so that both total surplus and marginal surplus are increasing
in the randomness parameter ε.
Because consumers lack flexibility in the short run, and also for political and social
reasons, the energy retail price pr is fixed ex ante. It is not state contingent. Then,
when in state ε, consumers choose to buy the quantity that solves
max
q
GS(q, ε)− prq
Let q (pr, ε) denote the solution to the first order condition
∂GS(q, ε)
∂q
= pr. (25)
Given a retail price fixed exogenously and constant, we can simplify the notation:
22For an analysis in terms of Cournot competition, see Le´autier (2018), chapter 9.
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q (ε)
def
= q (pr, ε)
and the inverse funtion will be denoted ε (q) .
By concavity, we have that
∂2GS
∂q2
< 0 ∂
2GS
∂q2
∂2GS
∂q∂ε
∂2GS
∂ε∂q
∂2GS
∂ε2
 > 0 (26)
Consequently,
ε
′
(q)
def
=
dε
dq
= −
∂2GS
∂q2
∂2GS
∂q∂ε
> 0 (27)
Now, let S (q) def= GS (q, ε (q))− prq
stand for the net consumer’s surplus expressed in terms of the random consumption.
Differentiation gives
S′ (q) = ∂GS
∂q
− pr

+
∂GS
∂ε
ε
′
(q) > 0
It is positive because the term into brackets is zero by (25), and the second term is
positive. Diffentiating a second time and using (27), we obtain
S” (q) = ε′ (q)
∂2GS
∂q∂ε
−
∂2GS
∂ε2
∂2GS
∂q2
∂2GS
∂q∂ε
+ ∂GS
∂ε
ε” (q)
The bracket on the right-hand side is negative by (26). Therefore, ε
”
(q) ≤ 0 is
sufficient, but not necessary, for S” (q) < 0 to hold.
Unconstrained and constrained consumption Except if both pr and K are very
high, it may occur that q (pr, ε) > K where K is the capacity installed by producers.
Let ε(pr,K)
def
= arg [q (pr, ε) = K]. Then actual consumption will be
qr (pr, ε) =
 q (pr, ε) if ε ≤ ε(pr,K)
K otherwise
Let F (ε) be the distribution function of the random variable ε. Using S(q) and F (q) =F (ε (q)) we can analyze the effects of variations in ε as if they were exogenous variations
in q.
As long as q ≤ K, consumers have the net surplus S(q). For q > K it is S(K).
Moreover, consumers face a disutility due to the lack of electricity supplied K compared
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to the quantity they expected to receive q. Let L(q−K) be the loss incurred when q > K.
It is an increasing and convex function. If there exists a system of (partial) compensation
paid by producers for this loss, then the net surplus of consumers isS(q) if q ≤ KS(K)− (1− α)L(q −K) otherwise
where (1− α) is the part of the loss not compensated to consumers.
6.1.2 Producers, retailers and social planner
Retailers buy from producers and sell to consumers. Omitting the commercialization
cost, their profit is (pr − p) q if q ≤ K and (pr − p)K otherwise where p is the wholesale
price. Retailers are pure price-takers.
Producers invest capacity K at cost C (K) , produce at unit cost c (assumed con-
stant) and sell at price p. Their ex post profit is then (p− c) q if q ≤ K and (p− c)K−
αL(q −K) otherwise, where α is the loss fraction compensated to consumers.
When vertically integrated, the ex post profit of the supply side is then (pr − c) q if
q ≤ K and (pr − c)K − αL(q −K) otherwise.
Finally, the ex post objective function of the social planner is
S(q)
def
= GS (q,ε (c, q))− cq if q ≤ K
S(K)− L(q −K) otherwise
6.2 Competitive energy markets
Each region is made of competitive energy producers. Let mi = p
r
i − ci stand for the
unit retail margin in region i. As for the welfare losses from energy shortage, producers
internalize a part α of the missing expected social value.
6.2.1 Autarky
Without any possibility to exchange capacity or energy, producers in region i would
solve a problem isomorphic to the problem of the regulator in the autarky framework
if i) mi = si, that is if each kWh is billed at the consumer’s willingness-to-pay: p
r
i = ui
and ii) α = 1. In other words, regulators impose a large penalty, or suppliers are obliged
to repair all the damages due to energy cuts so that producers fully internalize welfare
losses. Then the market solution is the same as (10) .
6.2.2 Interconnected regions
We now turn to the case where energy can be traded among electricity suppliers of
the two regions. To keep things comparable with the former section, we assume that
producers in each region must be able to satisfy at least low demand with the mix of
their own capacity and energy imports or exports. As usual, the problem is solved
backwards.
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Energy market Ex post, capacity is fixed in both regions. Given Ki, the producers
in i must decide how much to provide to their customers. Let ei denote the quantity
they intend to import from (if positive) or sell to (if negative) producers in region −i.
• When demand is high in i, producers solve
max
ei
mi (Ki + ei)− αiLi

qHi −Ki − ei

− pei s.t. − ei ≤ Ki
where p is the unit price on the energy market.
Let µiH ≥ 0 denote the multiplier associated to the capacity constraint. The first
order condition for i = 1, 2 is
mi + αiL
′
i

qHi −Ki − ei

− p+ µiH = 0 (28)
and the complementary slackness condition is
Ki + ei ≥ 0, µiH ≥ 0, (Ki + ei)µiH = 0 (29)
First observe that from (28) p ≥ mi: the energy price cannot be smaller than the
margin from retail. If it were smaller, firms in region i would like to be pure suppliers,
buying energy from the other region to sell in their home market and earn the unit
trade margin mi − p. Competition would then push the energy price up to at least the
value mi.
Now, consider how firms in region i decide on being energy importers or exporters:
• — if p > mi + αiL
′
i

qHi

, then µiH > 0 and by (29) we obtain −ei = Ki. In
words, the energy market is so profitable and the local benefit (margin +
consumers’ losses) so low that firms in i prefer to sell all the energy they
produce to the other region.
— if p < mi+αiL
′
i

qHi

, then Ki+ ei > 0 and by (29) we obtain µiH = 0. The
energy to be bought or sold is given by
mi + αiL
′
i

qHi −Ki − ei

− p = 0 (30)
Differentiating this condition, we obtain ei as a decreasing function of p:
dei
dp
=
− 1
αiL”
< 0.
Taking all this together, we can draw the energy demand of type 1 firms in Figure
4. For p > m1 + α1L
′
1

qH1 −K1

firms in region 1 want to sell energy (e1 < 0) and
they want to be buyers if p is smaller than this threshold (e1 > 0). We also see that
a smaller K1 corresponds to a shift rightwards of the whole curve. Indeed with a low
capacity, firms in 1 are more inclined at being buyers of energy. Conversely, equipped
with K1 ≥ q
H
1 they only want to be sellers.
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Figure 4: Demands for energy and equilibrium in state HL
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• When demand is low in region i, producers solve
max
ei
mi (Ki + ei)− αiLi

qLi −Ki − ei

− pei s.t. q
L
i ≤ Ki + ei
Note that the constraint is different from the one in the high demand case. The first
order condition is
mi + αiL
′
i

qLi −Ki − ei

− p+ µiL = 0
and the complementary slackness condition is
Ki + ei − q
L
i ≥ 0, µiL ≥ 0,

Ki + ei − q
L
i

µiL = 0
Again, we see that there is no solution for p < mi. Moreover
◮ if p > mi + αiL
′
i (0) = mi, then µiL > 0 and we obtain −ei = Ki − q
L
i . In words,
firms in i want to import or export the exact quantity that will satisfy demand
qLi given the capacity: to export if Ki > q
L
i and to import if Ki < q
L
i .
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◮ if p = mi, the only solution to αiL
′
i

qLi −Ki − ei

+ µiL = 0 is µiH = 0 and
qLi −Ki − ei = 0.
Consequently, when demand is low, the demand function of firms in region i is a
vertical line above mi with value ei = qLi −Ki on the x-axis. This is portrayed in Figure
4 for firms in region 2, reading from right to left, i.e. −e2 = K2 − qL2 In the graph,
firms in region 2 intend to import since K2 < qL2 .
• The market equilibrium condition is
e1 + e2 = 0 (31)
The curves ei and −ej can intersect in different ways depending on the parameters
and on the capacity chosen at the initial stage. To simplify our analysis, we assume
that the equilibrium solution is interior when at least one demand is high.
We have four different possibilities, depending on the states of the world:
◮ in state HH, using (30),
pHH = m1 + α1L
′
1

qH1 −K1 − e1

= m2 + α2L
′
2

qH2 −K2 + e1

(32)
in the case where e2 = −e1 = 0.
These equations determine the equilibrium demand and supply of energy eiHH ,
i = 1, 2, and the price pHH as functions of the capacity installed by the two groups of
producers. It is easy to check that ∂eiHH∂Ki = −
L”i
L”i+L
”
j
< 0 and ∂eiHH∂Kj =
L”j
L”i+L
”
j
> 0 since
if firms i have invested more in capacity, they will demand (alt. sell) less (alt. more)
energy, and the opposite stands for the firms in region j.
23Recall that this is the consequence of the constraint we set from the very beginning. Without it,
firms would like to sell more abroad and incur the cost of lost load even when demand is low.
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◮ in state HL, since e2HL = q
L
2 −K2 = −e1HL,
pHL = m1 + α1L
′
1

qH1 + q
L
2 −K1 −K2

This is the case represented in Figure 4.
◮ symmetrically in state LH, e1LH = q
L
1 −K1 = −e2LH
pLH = m2 + α2L
′
2

qL1 + q
H
2 −K1 −K2

◮ finally in state LL, there is no trade since e1 + e2 = q
L
1 + q
L
2 −K1 −K2 < 0.
Capacity stage Anticipating the energy equilibrium, at the ex ante stage firms i
solve
max
Ki
ρHH

mi (Ki + eiHH)− αiLi

qHi −Ki − eiHH

− pHHeiHH

+ρHL

mi (Ki + eiHL)− αiLi

qHi −Ki − eiHL

− pHLeiHL

+ρLH

mi (Ki + eiLH)− αiLi

qLi −Ki − eiLH

− pLHeiLH

(33)
+ρLLmiq
L
i −Ci (Ki)
In the perfect competition framework, producers do not internalize any effect of
their decisions on the future energy equilibrium. In particular, we have that ∂p
∂Ki
≡ 0 in
all states of nature. Given the equilibrium defined in (32) and the similar conditions in
the other states of nature, the first-order condition writes
ρHH

mi + αiL
′
i

qHi −Ki − eiHH
	
+ ρHL

mi + αiL
′
i

qHi −Ki − eiHL
	
+ρLH

mi + αiL
′
i

qLi −Ki − eiLH
	
= C
′
i (Ki) i = 1, 2
Since Ki + ei is the energy supplied by firm i to its consumers, and since energy values
are equal in the two markets given (32) and the equivalent conditions in the other states
of nature, this pair of equalities is the same as (16) and (17) as long as i) firms have no
market power, i.e. mi = si, and ii) they fully internalize welfare losses, i.e. αi = 1.
6.3 The trading of composite capacity rights
When firms in region i can rely on energy from the capacity credits bought, they solve
max
Ki,ki
−Ci (Ki) + ρi

si (Ki + ki)− αiLi

qHi −Ki − ki

+ (1− ρi) siq
L
i − pkki + pKiKi
s.t. Ki + ki ≥ Ki (λi)
where ki stands for the purchases (if positive) or sales (if negative) of withdrawal rights
and pk for the credits unit price. As for the capacity payment, it is pKi indexed by i
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since in each region regulators can have different objectives and constraints. The value
of pKi also depends on the target Ki. In particular, pKi = 0 whenever Ki ≤ Kαi .
The first order conditions (assuming Ki > 0) are
Ki : −C
′
i (Ki) + ρi

si + αiL
′
i

qHi −Ki − ki
	
+ pKi + λi = 0
ki : ρi

si + αiL
′
i

qHi −Ki − ki
	
− pk + λi = 0
For large values of pKi and/or small values of the target Ki, firms invest and trade
beyond the requirement (Ki + ki > Ki), so that λi = 0. The solution Ki,ki would be
given by24
C
′
i (Ki)− pKi = pk = ρi

si + αiL
′
i

qHi −Ki − ki
	
Like in section 4.2, we rather assume that pKi is low enough for having λi > 0. Then,
by complementary slackness conditions, the solution is Ki + ki = Ki, with
C
′
i
 Ki − ki	− pKi = pk (34)
This is the inverse demand for certificates. It is a decreasing relationship between
quantities ki and price pk
dki
dpk
= −
1
C
”
i
 Ki − ki	 < 0
This demand function is shifted downwards when the capacity payment increases.
Given the demand in each region, at equilibrium, k∗1 + k
∗
2 = 0, or
C
′
1
 K1 − k∗1	− pK1 = p∗k = C ′2  K2 − k∗2	− pK2
This is shown in Figure 5 where demand from region 1 (resp. 2) reads from left to
right (resp. from right to left). In the left part of the graph, firms in region 1 intend
to sell and firms in region 2 intend to buy. In the right part, it is the opposite. In the
case considered here, firms in region 2 (resp. 1) invest more (resp. less) than required
by the authority: K∗1 =
K1 − k∗1 < K1 and K∗2 = K2 − k∗2 > K2.
24This is obviously the case when Ki ≤ K
α
i .
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Figure 5: Equilibrium in the market for capacity credits
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